could better engage and defeat him. Although British troops landed with the mission of destroying Continental Army military supplies, whaleboat warriors cut them off from their ships and prevented both support and a safe retreat. The same newspaper later stated that it was "no small difficulty to lead Washington into such an error" (p.166).

The author focuses about half the book on the Sound's history during and around the Revolutionary War. The best-known and most costly raid was the Battle of Groton Heights under the command of Benedict Arnold where 88 Americans were killed. He then closes with the War of 1812 and its aftermath. The first of two notable maritime actions in the Sound was the April 1814 raid on Essex (then Potopaug), Connecticut. There the British burned and/or captured a number of vessels, and destroyed houses and marine supplies, and subsequently, attempted a raid on Stonington that was unsuccessful. This notable Connecticut Yankee defensive action was well publicized and used as an example of resolve in the face of an overwhelming force — a smaller-scale defense on the line of that at Fort McHenry. Ironically, since war can be profitable, the mariners of the Sound contributed to both the British in their war against Napoleon and the American Second War of Independence.

Radune identifies and organizes about two hundred years of fascinating and difficult-to-find information related to activities on or around Long Island Sound making this work a useful reference resource. A minor flaw is in the editing. The same events are repetitiously described in almost the same language in some chapters. Also, the author presents a myriad of details in his narrative. At times, it reads like he is describing a painting, brush stroke by brush stroke, with only occasional glances at the entire scene he is creating. This makes for tedious reading, but only in places. Taken as a whole, however, *Sound Rising* is a scholarly historiography about a geographical area where significant maritime events occurred. Radune's work would be a welcome addition in any American maritime historian's library.

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Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. *Allies Against the Rising Sun. The United States, the British Nations and the Defeat of Imperial Japan.* Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, www.kansaspress.ku.edu, 2009. xxi + 458 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US $39.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-7006-1669-5.

The publisher's jacket notes for this book tell us that "the role of America's British Allies in the Pacific Theatre has been largely ignored" and that the author has revisited this period "to depict the delicate dance among uneasy partners in their fight against Japan, offering the most detailed assessment ever published" of the Alliance. Whether this was really the author's intention and how successful he has been is what this review will examine.

What the author seeks to do in this book is to examine the role of the U.K. and its Commonwealth dominions, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, in planning the defeat of Japan. He looks at why Britain, at war with Germany and Italy since 1939, was prepared to participate in the military defeat of Japan despite an increasing sense of war-weariness; at why the Commonwealth nations were also prepared to join this effort (and how their reasons for doing so reflected differing concepts of nationhood and the future world order); and at why the U.S., having borne the brunt of the struggle against Japan for three years, was prepared to accept help from their allies

rather than claim all the glory for itself.

This book is not primarily about battles on land, at sea or in the air, though there are three chapters about the land and sea actions on and around Okinawa, another on the British Pacific Fleet's actions under Admiral Halsey's command off Japan itself and also General Le May's "rain of fire" with his B-29 Superfortress bombers over Japan. Rather, it is about the battles fought between the politicians of the various allied nations and also between the main military commanders and the chiefs of staff in the U.S. and U.K. He examines the different standpoints and the reasons for these views. Interestingly, in his final chapter, the author covers what happened to these important personalities after the war. The majority of the chapters, however, covers the policy battles and the various conferences in London, Quebec and Potsdam and addresses the growing anxiety over the casualties likely to be suffered in an invasion of the Japanese homeland, one of the main reasons for President Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb to bring about the surrender that Japan was plainly unable to contemplate.

The Okinawa operations are clearly an area of particular expertise on the part of the author, an assistant professor at the Naval War College and author of two works on this topic. Perhaps this has led him to over-emphasize this campaign. Nevertheless, what Sarantakes has done overall is to remind American readers that the story of the war in the Pacific is not just a series of American battles punctuating the period between the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the final surrender in Tokyo Bay in 1945. Other countries were involved in some of these battles and also fought the Japanese in other theatres as well.

There is no doubt that the bonds forged between the U.S., Britain and the Commonwealth Nations were a major factor in the continuation of allied cooperation in the early Cold War period, even if one does not believe wholly in the "special relationship."

The author has produced a very readable account of how and why decisions were reached and how the personalities (and foibles) of the main players were an important aspect of the decisions. He also reveals the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring and sheer stubbornness (particularly by Churchill and Admiral E.J. King, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Navy) that was frequently part of the decision-making process. Other works have tended to gloss over the full extent of the wrangling that went on between the Allies and also between their politicians and the military commanders. The short profiles on each of the main and supporting characters add both interest and credibility to the story. Moreover, the brief accounts in the final chapter of what happened to them after the war is an unusual feature. It is a humbling fact that many of them did not live long into retirement.

The book is extremely well researched, especially in the diaries of the central participants as well as other works about them. There are nearly 50 pages of notes and references, a 17-page bibliography and a 13-page index. There is a sprinkling of photographs, mainly of the personalities and conferences but some of the ships mentioned, though sadly these (and the maps of the Okinawa campaign) are not indexed.

Whether this book is "the most detailed assessment ever published," as the publisher would have us believe, is a more difficult question. On the British side, this topic has been extensively covered by H. P. Willmott in his three-volume study of the strategic policies of the countries involved and in various other works. Other authors have also carried out a considerable amount of research on this topic in this period. This is not to criticise Prof. Sarantakes' work,

however, but rather to set it in context. Overall it is often worth following a different approach, particularly when it produces such a very readable result.

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Thomas Wildenberg and Norman Polmar. *Ship Killers. A History of the American Torpedo.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.nip.org, 2010. xvi+268 pp., illustrations, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US $52.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-59114-668-9.

Whether launched from a submarine, from the deck of a torpedo boat or destroyer, or dropped from an aircraft, the torpedo has been an effective anti-ship weapon for nearly one hundred years. Much has been written about weapons systems — submarines, torpedo boats, surface ships equipped with torpedo tubes, and torpedo-carrying aircraft — but little has been written about the actual torpedo itself. With *Ship Killers. A History of the American Torpedo,* accomplished naval authors Thomas Wildenberg and Norman Polmar help to fill the gap in understanding the development of a weapon that played such a major part in the Second World War.

The authors begin with the early attempts from 1775 to 1865 to develop both a submarine and a torpedo to arm the submarine. The stories of the *Turtle* in the American Revolution, the CSS *David* and *Hunley* and the USS *Albemarle*, though well-known to historians, are included for completeness. The narrative then moves to the development of the true torpedo. Modern readers may be surprised that the idea which formed the basis of the torpedo as we know it came from the Austrian Navy and was refined by Englishman Robert Whitehead. The eventual success of the torpedo came to the attention of the U.S. Navy, and it is at that point that the narrative focuses on the topic of how the American torpedo was developed and used.

Moving chronologically, the authors start with early U.S. Navy efforts to develop a torpedo, the various competing designs, and its final successful form in the 1890s. A description of the creation of the submarine — the seemingly-eternal marriage of the torpedo and its weapons system — is included. The establishment of the Naval Torpedo Station in Newport, RI, is related along with its importance to the American torpedo saga. Development of the torpedo lagged during the 1920s and 1930s due to financial pressures and isolationism, an oversight that caught up with the U.S. Navy for the first part of the Pacific War.

Much can be learned from Wildenberg's and Polmar's research. It is surprising that the U.S. Navy really only used torpedoes in combat in the Second World War, and that with mixed results. Only once during the Korean War was the American torpedo used in a combat mission; the U.S. Navy fired no torpedoes in the Spanish-American War, the First World War, or the Vietnam War.

The American torpedo saw its greatest use during the Second World War, and what a story it was. For the first two years of the Pacific War, American torpedoes were usually defective, suffering from inadequate firing pins, a magnetic exploder mechanism that failed to function as promised and torpedoes that ran too deeply to sink a ship. The problem was, in part, one of cost: even a practice torpedo is an expensive, precision instrument. Performing failure analysis (to use a modern term) on a torpedo means firing a costly weapon to its destruction. Fortunately, criticism of the American torpedoes led to investigations and ultimately, the defects were resolved. By late 1943, the U.S. Navy finally had effective torpedoes.